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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
As the dissent stated, the testatrix' intention should not be defeated unless
it clearly prejudices the public interest.
Missouri cases are in agreement that courts should be extremely
cautious in holding a will provision void as against public policy. If the
Eyerman decision is read as expanding the application of the doctrine to
factual situations not previously held to be clearly in violation of the public interest, the result is highly questionable. Public policy should not be
used as an elastic concept to be readily extended to situations which the
court believes to be contrary to the public good, but which have never
been articulated in either judicial decision or statute to be actually contrary to the public interest.
TERESA WEAR

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RECOVERY
ALLOWED FOR NEUTRAL ASSAULTS-RECOVERY
DENIED FOR PERSONALLY-MOTIVATED ASSAULTS
Person v. Scullin Steel Co.'
2
Allen v. Dorothy's Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co.
Person, an employee of Scullin Steel Company, was in the habit of
driving Barber, a fellow employee, to work each day. Stopping by Barber's
house on November 7, 1970, Person was told by Barber's wife that her
husband would not be going to work that day. Person proceeded without
him. Barber subsequently accosted Person at work and berated him for
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public
policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems which are
controversial in nature and capable of solution only as the result of
a study of various factors and conditions. It is only when a given policy
is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare
that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court
may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There
must be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of
what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal ....

If, in the

domain of economic and social controversies, a court were, under the guise
of the application of the doctrine of public policy, in effect to enact provisions which it might consider expedient and desirable, such action would
be nothing short of judicial legislation, and each such court would be

creating positive laws according to the particular views and idiosyncracies
of its members. Only in the clearest cases, therefore, may a court make an
alleged public policy the basis of judicial decision.
Id. at 825, 17 A.2d at 409. See also Jenkins v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 107

F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir. 1939); In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 501, 291 S.W.
120, 123, cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927); In re Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299,

303, 22 A.2d 680, 683 (1941).
1. 523 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. 523 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. App., D.K.G. 1975).
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not waiting for him. Person went about his work, but shortly thereafter
was unexpectedly shoved by Barber, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. 3 Person's claim for workmen's compensation was denied.
Allen, an employee of Dorothy's Laundry & Dry Cleaning Company,
was shot by a berserk rifleman while delivering laundry for his employer.
Allen was apparently the victim of a "radical protestor" who also killed
two policemen during his shooting spree. Allen's claim for workmen's compensation was upheld.
In both Person and Allen the courts were called upon to construe
Missouri's amended workmen's compensation statute, section 287.120 (1),
RSMo 1969. Section 287.120(1) defines an employer's liability for injury
or death of an employee stemming from an accident "arising out of and in
the course of employment." 4 A 1969 amendment added the following to
section 287.120(1):
The term "accident" as used in this section shall include, but not
be limited to, injury or death of the employee caused by the unprovoked violence or assault against the employee by any person.5
Person contended that this statute should be construed to mean that
all work-related assaults, except those in which the claimant was the
aggressor, should be compensable. 6 Allen contended that all unprovoked
assaults should be compensable, and further, that no connection with the
job need be shown.7
The Supreme Court of Missouri held in Person that claimant's in-

juries were not compensable because they arose out of a personal dispute.,
The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals decided in
Allen that compensation should be awarded because the claimant was
the victim of a neutral attack, not having its origins in either Allen's
employment or in his personal matters.9 In both cases the courts found
that the 1969 amendment eliminated the necessity for showing that the
5. Some evidence indicated the argument was pursued again at the time
Barber shoved Person. 523 S.W.2d at 802.
4. Prior to the 1969 amendment, this section read in part:
[T]he employer shall be liable irrespective of negligence, to furnish
compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury
or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment....
"Arising out of" the employment generally means that the injury was caused
by an increased risk which claimant was subjected to by his employment. "In
the course of" employment means that an injury takes place within the time
period of the employment, at a location where the employee should reasonably
be while fulfilling his duties or something incidental to them. 1 A. LARSON, THE
LAW or WoaMmEN's COmPENSATION §§ 6.00, 14.00 (1952).

5. § 287.120(1), RSMo 1969.
6. 523 S.W.2d at 803.
7. 523 S.W.2d at 877.
8. The court rejected the contention that an argument over transportation

to and from work was connected with the employment. 523 S.W.2d at 806.
9. 523 S.W.2d at 878.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/16
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assault arose out of the employment only in the case of neutral assaults,
leaving assaults stemming from personal matters uncompensable.
Workmen's compensation provides benefits to employees who sustain
injury in a work-related accident, regardless of negligence or fault on the
part of the employee. An "accident" is defined in Missouri as "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury."' 0 In Missouri assaults are deemed to be accidents for purposes of
workmen's compensation." However, unlike other accidents where negligence is of no consequence, the cause of an assault is important in determining whether it is compensable. Assaults are generally categorized
into three classes: those distinctly associated with the employment,' 2 those
personal to the claimant,' 3 and those which are neutral assaults-stemming
14
neither from employment nor from personal beginnings.
For an assault to be compensable under Missouri law before 1969, it
had to "arise out of" the work situation and thus fall in the category of
assaults distinctly associated with the employment. A compensable assault
must have had its origin in something connected with the employment or
some particular duty which the employment imposed, 1 or the employment had to expose the employee to an unusual risk of injury which was
not shared by the public.' 6 Consequently, prior to 1969 neither so-called
"neutral assaults"' 7 nor personally-motivated assaults' s were compensable.
Two 1965 neutral assault cases denied claims specifically because the
10. § 287.020 (2), RSMo 1969.
11. Keithley v. Stone &Webster Eng'r Corp., 226 Mo. App. 1122, 1127-28, .9
S.W.2d 296, 300 (K.C. Ct. App. 1982).
12. Missouri finds a risk to be distinctly associated with the employment
when the degree to which the employee is exposed to it by reason of his employment is over and above that of the public at large. Sweeney v. Sweeney Tire
Stores Co., 227 Mo. App. 93, 100, 49 S.W.2d 205, 208 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932); In
Sweeney the decedent, manager of a tire store, was killed during a robbery. The
court held that the assault was peculiar and special to the status of the deceased
as a manager and therefore compensable.
13. Personal assaults are those which have no connection with the employment-e.g., an assault stemming from an argument over a bottle of wine when
wine was not permitted on the employer's premises and had nothing to do with
work. Lardge v. Concrete Products Mfg. Co., 251 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1952).
14. 1 A. LARSON, TnE LAw or WORmmEN's COMPENSArON § 11.31 (1952). See
Ries v. DeBord Plumbing Co., 186 S.W.2d 488 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945) (claimant
was assaulted when leaving work for no known reason and without provocation).
15. Macalik v. Planters Realty Co., 144 S.W.2d 158, 159 (St. L. Mo. App.
1940).
16. Ries v. DeBord Plumbing Co., 186 S.W.2d 488, 489 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945).
17. Kelley v. Sohio Chem. Co., 383 S.W.2d 146 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964), af 'd,
392 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. En Banc 1965); Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co., 391 S.W.2d
948 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Scherr v. Siding & Roofing Sales Co., 805 S.W.2d 62
(St. L. Mo. App. 1957); May v. Ozark Cent. Tel. Co., 272 S.W.2d 845 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1954); Long v. Schultz Shoe Co., Inc., 257 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App.
1953); Ries v. DeBord Plumbing Co., 186 S.W.2d 488 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945).
18. Toole v. Bechtel Corp., 291 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1956); Foster v. Aines Farm
Dairy Co., 263 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1954); Lardge v. Concrete Products Mfg. Co., 251
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injuries did not "arise out of" the employment. In Kelley v. Sohio Chemical
Co.19 an employee was struck in the head by an unknown assailant for
no apparent motive. The Missouri Supreme Court denied compensation
because the claimant had failed to meet her burden of showing that her
work exposed her to extra hazards and that there was a direct causal
connection between the assault and her employment. The court stated:
"It is not sufficient that the employment may simply have furnished an
occasion for an injury from some unconnected source."2 0 In Liebman v.
Colonial Baking Co.21 the St. Louis Court of Appeals denied recovery to
a bakery employee who was assaulted by a drunken stranger while delivering bread, for the same reasons as stated in Kelley.
These two decisions were consistent with the Missouri courts' rejection
of the "positional-risk" doctrine. This doctrine, which can be used to
justify coverage of all varieties of neutral injury-producing risks, is that:
An injury arises out of the employment if it would not have
occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of
the employment placed claimant in the position where he was
injured. 22
Positional-risk was expressly rejected in Missouri in Lathrop v. TobinHamlton Shoe Manufacturing Co. 23 Lathrop was a case of a classic neutral
risk, where a driverless, runaway car crashed through the window next to
which claimant was working and injured her. Compensation was denied
on the grounds that the injury was not a rational consequence of a hazard
connected with the employment.
In both Person and Allen the courts found that the 1969 amendment
to section 287.120(1) was intended to enlarge the category of compensable
assaults to include neutral assaults such as those in Kelley and Liebman.
Thus, a claimant in a neutral assault case such as Allen is no longer forced
to show that the injury was one which had a direct connection with the
employment. Such a claimant now has to show only that he was in the
course of his employment and that the assault did not stem from a personal motivation. In Person, however, the court found that the legislature
had not intended to enlarge the category of compensable assaults to include
those that are personally motivated. Refusing compensation for personallymotivated assaults is consistent with the view of most jurisdictions. 24
Judge Bardgett dissented in Person, saying that the legislature intended to compensate even privately-motivated assaults. He based this
S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1952); Staten v. Long-Turner Constr. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1945).
19. 383 S.W.2d 146 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964), aff'd, 392 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. En
Banc 1965).
20. 392 S.W.2d at 257.
21. 391 S.W.2d 948 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
22. 1 A. LARSON, Tr LAw oF Womnm's COMPENSATION § 6A0 (1952).
23. 402 S.W.2d 16 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
24. Freeman v. Callow, 525 S.W.2d 371, 376 n.3 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/16
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position on the fact that compensation was denied in Kelley and Liebman
because the assaults did not "arise out of" the employment, not because
the attacks were provoked. 2 5 This analysis of Kelley and Liebman and the
subsequent amendment to the statute led Judge Bardgett to conclude that
all assaults, even those with an origin outside the employment, are compensable, except where the claimant provoked the attack.20 This broad view
of the amendment, however, would extend coverage far beyond its past
limits in Missouri, and in fact beyond that allowed in most states. 27
In Person and Allen the Missouri courts have adopted a positionalrisk theory, at least in assault cases. To be compensable, non-personallymotivated assaults need only occur "in the course of" the employment,
but need not be distinctly associated with the employment. However, all
personally-motivated assaults will remain noncompensable. Such a test is
unique in the workmen's compensation area in Missouri, going further
in allowing compensation for an assault than other types of accidents.
The Missouri courts in Person and Allen have recognized the need
to extend workmen's compensation benefits to neutral assault victims in
their interpretation of section 287.120(1), although the section itself is
unclear in its wording and intent. 28 It seems that this view should logically be extended to allow compensation for all neutral accidents, not
just assaults. The "runaway car" type of case would then be compensable.
Applying the positional-risk theory to other types of accidents in which
the employee is injured from a non-work-related source would place
regular accident coverage on a parallel with assault coverage. If compensation were extended to neutral accidents, only those injuries which were
received due to idiopathic causes-i.e., causes peculiar to the employee and
in no way stemming from the employment activity, would remain non29
compensable.
The purpose of workmen's compensation is to provide recovery for
employment-associated injuries. Refusing to compensate only personal assault victims and those who suffer injuries due to idiopathic causes would
be consistent with this goal. It would make the employer bear the burden
of all injuries which were work-related, either directly, or because of the
25. 523 S.W.2d at 807-08.
26. This interpretation of the Kelley and Liebman decisions ignores the
fact that the assaults in both cases were "neutral" rather than privately-motivated.
Therefore, legislative intent to compensate personal assaults was not necessarily
the reason for the amendment to section 287.120(1).
27. Only Louisiana compensates private assaults which have no connection
with the employment other than that they occur during the course of the employment. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.21 (1952).
28. In fact, a literal reading of section 287.120 (1), RSMo 1969, gives no indication of a change in the law at all. The proviso defining "accident" to include
assault gives no indication that the "arising out of" or "in the course of" requirements are not to apply to assaults.
29. See Collins v. Combustion Eng'r Co., 490 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973). An example of an idiopathic cause of an accident is a dizzy spell caused
by an employee's non-work-related illness.
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location of the victim in his course of employment. Extending coverage to
neutral assaults, but not extending coverage to neutral accidents in
general, draws an illogical dividing line.
KRISTIE L. KELL
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